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STARPTAUTISKO TIESĪBU 
APAKŠNOZARE
Ensuring provision of human rights is a basic 
principle of a democratic state, as well as one of 
the elements of the rule of law. The State has the 
responsibility to provide the human rights and 
freedoms, as well as to eliminate any potential 
violations. The preamble to the Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (ECHR) states that respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms can best be 
accomplished by an effective political democracy.
The purpose of the study is to determine the 
values of the Constitution for the national judicial 
decisions in Latvia and Finland to ensure the right 
to a fair trial in the context of the provisions of 
the European Convention and the ECHR and the 
most effective mechanisms to enforce the ECHR 
decision in the national court proceedings.
In a study presented to the comparative 
analysis of the Constitution of the European 
countries, Russia and the US, on the basis of 
which the author presented the position that the 
protection of national security and human rights 
of the Constitution states take precedence over 
international law, which only complement its 
basic principles.
The dialectical method was used in analysing 
the implementation of the European Convention, 
while preserving the sovereignty of the Council 
of Europe member states. Formal­logical method 
used in the study of provisions of the Constitution 
of Republic of Latvia and the Republic of Finland, 
the European Convention, the Court’s practice, 
and others.
The enforcement of the method of analysis 
and synthesis has secured a systemic approach 
to the study of the theory of statehood and law.
Formulated by the author and findings 
complement and develop the present in the theory 
of state and law sections on Human Rights to a 
fair trial.
The supremacy of the Constitution of the 
Republic of Finland consolided in Article 106. 
If, in a matter being tried by a court of law, 
the application of an Act would be in evident 
conflict with the Constitution, the court of law 
shall give supremacy to the provision in the 
Constitution1. According Chapter 8 Section 94 
(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of Finland 
an international obligation shall not endanger the 
democratic foundations of the Constitution. 
According to article 6, the US Constitution 
and the United States laws passed within its 
framework, as well as all the treaties concluded 
or to be signed on behalf of the United States, 
represent the supreme law of the country. At 
the same time, the American constitutional and 
legal doctrine divides the international treaties 
into self­executing ones (the enforcement of 
which does not require changing the national 
legislation) and non­self­executing ones that 
assume changes in the national legislation [6 
U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804)]. In the event 
of collision of norms of a self­executing 
international treaty and a national US law, with 
regard to their equal legal force, the applied 
rule is the one that was issued the latest (last­in­
time rule). In one of the judgements, the court 
of appeal found that “the rules of international 
agreement on extradition concluded between 
USA and France contradict to the Fourth 
Amendment to the US Constitution and therefore 
are not subject to enforcement”2.
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The criteria for limitations of international 
treaties were formulated later by the American 
judicial authorities within the framework of the 
doctrine of self­executing treaties, on the basis of 
interpretation of the relevant provisions of the US 
Constitution. The origination of the doctrine of 
self­executing international treaties in the legal 
practice of the United States has roots in the 
judgement made in 1829 by the Chairman of the 
Supreme Court of the United States John Marshall, 
with regard to Foster case, that concerned the 
enforcement of the Spanish­American treaty of 
1819 which was specifying, inter alia, the legal 
consequences of transfer of Florida to the United 
States, alienated from Spain.
In particular, Professor Bederman David J. 
referred to the effectuation of international law 
norms in the legal system of the United States 
as follows: “Regardless of whether the matter of 
consideration is a legal dispute in connection with 
an air crash, which may involve the provisions 
of the Warsaw Convention for the Unification of 
Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage 
by Air for its resolution, ... or protection of human 
rights guaranteed by the Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights of 1966, in all these cases, one of 
the key issues is the question of possible use of 
the relevant international treaties as the sources 
of legal norms, that impose legal obligations 
on the parties to a court process held within the 
United States”3.
Other American researchers, upon conside­
ration of the enforcement of the international law 
rules, also refer to the United States Constitution 
and the legal precedents that were used as a 
background for interpretation of a number of 
provisions of this document.
One of the American courts of appeal 
confirmed this position in the judgement with 
regard to the case of Committee of United States 
Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Regan4. The Court 
noted, “Not a single ruling of the Congress may 
be challenged only on the grounds that it violates 
the common international law”. The Court 
also pointed out that the political and judicial 
authorities of the United States have the right to 
ignore the rules of customary international law 
in the process of enforcement of laws and other 
federal statutory acts.
In considering this case, the Court of Appeal 
referred to Professor L.Henkin, noting that in 
a number of European countries treaties take 
precedence over all inconsistent laws5.
Nevertheless, “the jurisprudence of the 
Supreme Court in respect of the treaties 
inevitably reflects certain assumed obligations 
of the international law and of the legislation of 
the United States of America....”6. 
A landmark in the international law of the 
United States was the consideration case of 
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, Court of Appeals, 
Second Circuit, 30 June 1980. The court issued 
a precedent for US federal courts prescribing 
punishment to the USA aliens for tortious acts 
committed outside the United States, in violation 
of the international public law where the USA is 
a party. Thus the jurisdiction of the USA courts 
in respect of civil tort was extended.
The Court held that the extension of the 
international law also changed the principle of 
the internal law, when the acts of the Congress 
can not be infringed, but it is possible to replace 
the earlier contradictory treaties or customary 
rules of international law. 
The author emphasizes that the Italian judicial 
practice adheres to a dualistic conception, as 
concerns the relationship between the inter­
national and national law. The treaty, like in the 
USA, has the same legal status as the law. In 
the event of collision between the constitutional 
provisions and the international treaty, the priority 
in enforcement is given to the Constitution. In 
one of the cases, the Constitutional Court of Italy 
recognized that “the covenant on extradition 
between the USA and Italy is unconstitutional 
and therefore can not be applied”7.
The author also refers to the B.I. Osminin’s data 
on domestic procedures required for expressing 
consent to the binding authority of international 
treaties8. The international treaties concluded 
with prior consent of the Parliament, rank higher 
in the internal law of Span than ordinary laws, 
but are inferior to the Constitution and should not 
contradict to it.
In Portugal, the international treaties 
concluded with the approval of the Parliament, 
have priority over the ordinary law, but are 
inferior to the Constitution.
In Spain, according to art. 96 (1) of the 
Constitution, the properly concluded and 
officially published international treaties form 
part of its national legislation. The international 
treaties concluded with prior consent of the 
Parliament, rank higher in the internal law of 
Span than ordinary laws, but are inferior to the 
Constitution and should not contradict to it.
According to the Constitution of France, 
conclusion of international treaties or covenants 
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containing provisions contrary to the Constitution 
is possible only after its revision (Art. 54). If the 
Constitutional Council rules that an international 
obligation is contrary to the Constitution, then 
the permission to ratification may be given only 
after revision of the Constitution. In this respect, 
the provisions contrary to the Constitution may 
be interpreted in a broader sense, as affecting 
or jeopardizing the essential conditions of the 
national sovereignty.
In the Netherlands, in accordance with art. 
91(3) of the Constitution, any provision of 
the international treaty that is in conflict with 
the Constitution is subject to approval by the 
majority of not less than 2/3 of the votes of the 
States General.
In the UK, an international treaty, even 
ratified and consummated, does not become part 
of the national law and may not be applied by the 
national courts as far as it is not implemented into 
the national legislation as a separate law. After 
that, it gains the effect of ordinary act that may 
be changed by a subsequent act.
The Constitutional Court ruled, as early 
as in 2005, that international norms of human 
rights and the practice of applying them on the 
level of constitutional law serve as a means of 
interpretation for establishing the content and 
scope of fundamental rights and the principles 
of a judicial state, insofar this does not lead to 
decreasing or restricting the human rights that are 
included in the Satversme9.
The Constitutional Court secures protection 
of human rights as well in conformity with the 
norms of the Constitution, applying different 
articles for particular cases. For instance, the 
Constitutional Court recognized that article 92 
of the Constitution in conjunction with article 90 
of the Constitution envisage the legislator’s duty 
to stipulate explicitly a procedure in the legal 
norms that will secure the individual’s explicit 
and firm confidence of his ability to protect his 
fundamental rights (Judgment of 24 October 
2013 by the Constitutional Court in Case No. 
2012­23­01, para 14.4 of the Findings).
As an example, the author refers to a similar 
practice of defending the fundamental national 
rights by the Federal Constitutional Court of the 
Federal Republic of Germany, which relies on 
the legal position, worked out on July 13, 2010, 
regarding the “restricted judicial validity of 
ECHR’s rulings”. In particular, in considering the 
issue of enforcement of the ruling of the European 
Court of Human Rights as of 26 February, 2004 
with regard to case of Görgülü v. Germany10. 
ECHR accepted that the refusal to commit the 
child to the care of his father without sufficient 
scrutiny of the matter and depriving the father 
of the right to see the child was breaching the 
relevant article of the Convention.
In June 2004, the Court of Appeal in 
Naumburg (Oberlandesgericht Naumburg) 
resolved that complying with ECHR judgements 
is not mandatory for the German courts. The 
Court emphasized that ECHR is not a higher 
judicial authority for the German courts. In the 
opinion of the Court, the judgement of ECHR 
creates an obligation for Germany as a subject of 
international law, but not for its courts of law – 
“the authorities responsible for administration of 
justice, which are independent, according to art. 
97.1 of the Basic La”.
The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany 
formulated the principle of the priority of the 
national constitution to the judgements of the 
European Court: The text of the EHRC and the 
practice of ECHR serve as means of interpretation 
on the level of constitutional law to determine 
the contents and scope of fundamental rights and 
the principle of the law­governed state, as far 
as it does not lead to decrease or limitation of 
fundamental rights, included in the Basic Law, 
that is – to influence, which is precluded by 
Article 53 of the EHRC11.
The Constitutional Court pointed out that in 
Germany the European Convention, as well as 
the protocols thereto, have only the status of 
federal law, so Germany’s Basic Law “is not open 
to the international law to the maximum possible 
extent”. The court stated that the Basic Law aims 
to integrate Germany into the legal community 
of peaceful and free states, but it does not waive 
the sovereignty ultimately provided for by the 
German constitution. That is, the Constitutional 
Court emphasized the importance of the German 
sovereignty, asserting that the Constitution takes 
precedence over international obligations.
A similar approach was used by the 
Constitutional Court of the Italian Republic, 
by rejecting the conclusions concerning the 
retirement payments, that were formulated in 
the judgement of ECHR with regard to case of 
Maggio and Others v. Italy of 31 May 201112.
The Constitutional Court of the Italian 
Republic stated in its ruling as of 19 November, 
2012 with regard to case N 264/2012, that 
compliance with international obligations can not 
be the cause of lowering the level of protection of 
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rights envisaged already in the internal legal order, 
and on the contrary, may and should represent 
an effective tool of extension of that defence; 
as a consequence, the contradiction between the 
protection provided by the Convention on Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the 
constitutional protection of fundamental rights 
must be resolved in the direction of maximum 
extension of guarantees and with a view of 
securing proper conformity with other interests 
defended by the Constitution. The Constitutional 
Court of the Italian Republic took its final 
decision on the priority of constitutional norms 
on 22 October, 2014. The resolution states that 
a decision of an international judicial body, in 
the event of conflict with the basic constitutional 
principles of the Italian law, makes any acceptation 
impossible in the context of article 10 of the 
Italian Republic’s Constitution.  The limits of the 
Constitutional Court’s resolution on declaring a 
law unconstitutional are of erga omnes character. 
The retroactivity principle lies in that the law 
declared unconstitutional does not have legal 
consequences and becomes null and void from 
the day following the day of publication of the 
court’s resolution (article 136 of the Constitution 
of the Italian Republic, in conjunction with article 
1 of the Constitutional Law 1948 N 1 and article 
30 (3) of the Law N 87/1953)13. 
The Constitutional Court of the Republic 
of Austria, recognizing the importance of the 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms and ECHR rulings based on it, also 
came to the conclusion on inexpediency of 
enforcement of the Convention’s provisions in 
the interpretation of ECHR, that are contrary to 
the national constitutional law (enactment as of 
14 October, 1987 with regard to case N B267/86).
Importantly, the ECHR judges noted in the 
case of Frodl v. Austria that any departure from the 
principle of universal suffrage risks undermining 
the democratic validity of the legislature thus 
elected and the laws it promulgates. Exclusion 
of any groups or categories of the general 
population must accordingly be reconcilable with 
the underlying purposes of Article 3 of Protocol 
No. 1. This standard of tolerance does not prevent 
a democratic society from taking steps to protect 
itself against activities intended to destroy the 
rights or freedoms set forth in the Convention 
Article 3 of Protocol No. 1.
The Court points out that Article 3 of 
Protocol No. 1 does not, as other provisions of 
the Convention, specify or limit the aims which a 
restriction must pursue. A wide range of purposes 
may therefore be compatible with Article 3 (see, 
for example, Podkolzina v. Latvia)14.
For example, in the case of Podkolzina the 
Court considers that the interest of each State 
in ensuring that its own institutional system 
functions normally is incontestably legitimate. 
That applies more to the national parliament, 
which is vested with legislative power and plays 
a primordial role in a democratic State. Similarly, 
regard being had to the principle of respect for 
national characteristics enunciated above, the 
Court is not required to adopt a position on 
the choice of a national parliament’s working 
language. That decision, which is determined by 
historical and political considerations specific to 
each country, is in principle one which the State 
alone has the power to make15.
The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in its 
resolution of 16 October, 2013 (UKSC 63) 
pointed out the unacceptability for the British 
legal system of the conclusions and construction 
of the Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, as interpreted in the 
ruling of ECHR of 6 October, 2005, with regard 
to case of John Hirst v. the United Kingdom16 
relative to the problem of prisoners’ electoral 
rights. The Court has had frequent occasion 
to highlight the importance of democratic 
principles underlying the interpretation and 
application of the Convention and it would take 
this opportunity to emphasise that the rights 
guaranteed under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 
are crucial to establishing and maintaining the 
foundations of an effective and meaningful 
democracy governed by the rule of law.
This standard of tolerance does not prevent a 
democratic society from taking steps to protect 
itself against activities intended to destroy the 
rights or freedoms set forth in the Convention. 
Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, which enshrines the 
individual’s capacity to influence the composition 
of the law­making power, does not therefore 
exclude that restrictions on electoral rights 
could be imposed on an individual who has, for 
example, seriously abused a public position or 
whose conduct threatened to undermine the rule 
of law or democratic foundations.
The author points out that in discussion 
of the case of Hirst v. the United Kingdom the 
Latvian Government were concerned that the 
Chamber’s judgment would have a horizontal 
effect on other countries which imposed a blanket 
80 ADMINISTRATĪVĀ UN KRIMINĀLĀ JUSTĪCIJA 2016 1/2 (74/75)
ban on convicted prisoners voting in elections. 
They submitted that, in this area, States should 
be afforded a wide margin of appreciation, in 
particular taking into account the historical and 
political evolution of the country and that the 
Court was not competent to replace the view of a 
democratic country with its own view as to what 
was in the best interests of democracy.
According to the Forfeiture Act 1870, all the 
prisoners were denied the right to vote. For 142 
years the prisoners were not allowed to vote, but 
ECHR passed its own judgement and reminded 
the member­states once again that the tacit and 
indiscriminate deprivation of voting rights 
infringes the Convention. The author refers to the 
statistics given by the Court relative to the voting 
right granted without restriction to prisoners, 
adopted in 18 countries.
According to the Government’s survey based 
on information obtained from its diplomatic 
representation, eighteen countries allowed 
prisoners to vote without restriction (Albania, 
Azerbaijan, Croatia, the Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Finland, “the former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia”, Germany, Iceland, Lithuania, 
Moldova, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland and Ukraine)17.
In the case of Markin v. Russia, ECHR 
established violation of article 8 and article 14 
of the Convention by Russia. In considering this 
case, the Constitutional Court of the Russian 
Federation announced its ruling with regard to 
the case of collision between its own judgements 
and the judgements of ECHR. In Russia, the 
RF Constitution has legal supremacy, while the 
exclusive right of interpretation and enforcement 
of the RF Constitution is the prerogative of the 
Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation; 
therefore its decisions have the inherent supreme 
legal effect as well.
According to article 15, the Russian Federation 
Constitution has the supreme legal force, 
immediate effect, and is enforced on the entire 
territory of the Russian Federation. The laws and 
other legal acts adopted in the Russian Federation 
must not contradict the Russian Constitution.
With regard for the best practices of the 
constitutional proceedings, including Germany, 
Britain, Italy and Austria, and the full compliance 
of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court of the 
Russian Federation on 14 July 2015 recognized 
the supremacy of the Constitution of the Russian 
Federation in enforcement of ECHR judgements. 
At the same time, the participation of the Russian 
Federation in the international treaty does not 
imply waiver of the national sovereignty, but the 
Convention and the legal positions of ECHR 
based on it may not override the priority of the 
Constitution. The Constitutional Court enacted that 
if the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation 
comes to the conclusion that an ECHR resolution 
based on the Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, interpreted contrary to 
the RF Constitution, may not be enforced, such 
resolution is not enforceable to this specific extent.
On 4 December 2015 the State Duma of the 
Russian Federation approved a law granting a 
right to the Constitutional Court of the Russian 
Federation to decide whether or not to enforce 
the verdicts of interstate bodies for protection of 
rights and freedoms, including Resolutions of 
ECHR passed within the framework of complaints 
against Russia. That is, the Constitution of the 
country has the absolute priority over other laws, 
including the international law that is nothing 
more than its complementation.
The author points out that in all of the above 
references it is not a matter of contradiction 
between the Convention and the national 
constitutions, but a conflict of interpretation of 
the Convention’s provision as given by ECHR 
in a particular case, the general principles of 
law recognized by civilized countries and the 
provisions of national Constitutions.
Recognition by the European Court of human 
rights violation in a particular case is a due 
practice. And a different thing is the demand on 
the part of ECHR to change the legislation in 
accordance with the general recommendations 
addressed by ECHR to a national legislation.
Accordingly, a conclusion of ECHR on 
incompatibility of any provisions of the member­
state’s legislation with the obligations under 
the Convention – including with regard for the 
assessment given to these provisions earlier 
by the Constitutional Court of the Republic of 
Latvia and the Supreme Court of the Republic 
of Finland – may not be regarded as absolutely 
binding to take general measures to amend the 
legal regulation in these countries.
This is contradicted to as well by the earlier 
judgements of ECHR made in 1997–2010, 
in which the Court repeatedly voiced in the 
period 1997–2010, that it is in the first place 
for the domestic authorities, notably the courts, 
to interpret and apply the domestic law and to 
decide on issues of constitutionality. The author 
emphasizes that these judgements were passed 
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in cases versus Germany and Spain, where 
the Constitutional courts emphasize the state 
sovereignty and the Constitution takes precedence 
over the international obligations18.
A different approach could lead to diminution 
of the importance of the Constitution as the act 
of supreme legal force valid on the territory of 
the country, and therefore – to undermining the 
foundations of the constitutional system and, in 
particular, the state sovereignty.
In the course of preparation of this Doctoral 
thesis, the author posed a number of questions, 
in particular, to the judges of the Supreme Court 
and the Supreme Administrative Court of the 
Republic of Finland.
The best comment to the position of the 
Supreme Court of Republic of Finland is 
contained in the answer to the questionnaire as 
of 28 December 2015 of the former President of 
the Supreme Court of the Republic of Finland 
Pauliine Koskelo and a ECHR judge from Finland 
since 1.1.201619. According to the ECHR judge, 
the Supreme Court’s position is based on 13 legal 
precedents of the court within the period 2009–
2015, reported to the author of the Doctoral thesis 
in response to the questionnaire. In her reply 
Pauliine Koskelo states that the best answers to 
the posed questions may be found in the study of 
the above judgements. Many of them encompass 
the relationship between the national laws and the 
European Convention. Judge Pauliine Koskelo 
notes that this judgement list is not exhaustive.
On 10.1.2016, an article of the former 
President of the Supreme Court Pauliine Koskelo 
entitled “The Supremacy of Law in Finland is 
jeopardized” was published as well. In accordance 
with the Constitution, the national rules must 
protect human rights and promote justice in the 
society. ECHR has repeatedly stressed that the 
member states have an obligation to organize 
their judicial system in such a way that the courts 
might enforce any of its requirements under the 
conditions of fair trial. 
“It is quite obvious that this approach has 
not been observed in Finland. First, we need 
to carry out reforms that will lead to cost 
reduction and streamline operation. In Finland, 
the Government has cut the funding, in the first 
place, therefore the requirements of fair trial are 
not always met”20.
The fullest attention to the supremacy of the 
Constitution was given by the Supreme Court 
of the Republic of Finland in the judgement 
ККО:2015:14 (the author analyzes this solution 
in more detail in Chapter 2.2.). The Supreme 
Court noted that § 106 of the Constitution 
does not provide for enforcement of the 
Constitution only in cases involving exceptional 
circumstances. The provision on fundamental 
rights of citizens is applied in the updated articles 
of the Constitution in terms of international 
obligations in the sphere of human rights, with 
the supremacy of the Constitution. § 106 of the 
Constitution rules that if, upon consideration of a 
case by court, the enforcement of a provision of 
law would be in evident contradiction with the 
Constitution, then the court must give preference 
to the Constitution. This obligation applies to all 
judicial proceedings21.
The research and analysis of legal practice 
make it possible to conclude that enforcement 
of laws at the state level is a prerogative falling 
under the competence of every sovereign state 
based on the Constitution.
The author notes that the Constitutional Court 
of the Republic of Latvia has not always accepted 
the position of ECHR as well. For example, the 
Constitutional Court of the Republic of Latvia 
disagrees with the opinion of the Saeima regarding 
the restricted freedom of action of the legislator. 
Consequently, there is no reason to apply the 
term of “freedom of action” in the meaning 
provided by the ECHR to the legislator in case 
if a constitutional court assesses lawfulness of 
activities taken by the legislator in the case of 
expropriation of real property22.
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Anotācija
Daudzās valstīs ir noteikts, ka Konstitūcija ir nozīmīgākais tiesību akts un starptautiskās saistības 
nevar ietekmēt Konstitūcijas demokrātisko pamatu. Cilvēktiesību garantēšana ir demokrātiskas 
valsts pamatprincips, kā arī tiesiskas valsts elements. Cilvēka tiesību un pamatbrīvību aizsardzības 
konvencijas preambulā noteikts, ka šīs pamatbrīvības vislabāk var nodrošināt ar efektīvas politiskas 
demokrātijas palīdzību. Analizējot Satversmes tiesas un Somijas Augstākās tiesas spriedumus, 
secināts, ka Konstitūcijai ir prioritāra nozīme, ja Cilvēka tiesību un pamatbrīvību aizsardzības 
konvencijas normu interpretācijas gaitā radušās konstitucionāli ­ tiesiskas kolīzijas.
Аннотация
Верховенство Конституции закреплено во многих государствах, и международные 
обязательства не должны создавать угрозу демократическим основам Конституции. Обес­
пе чение предоставления прав человека является одним из основных принципов демократи­
чес кого государства, а также одним из элементов правового государства. В преамбуле к Кон­
вен ции о защите прав человека и основных свобод говорится, что уважение прав человека 
и основ ных свобод лучше всего может быть достигнуто путем эффективной политической 
демократии. Из проведенного анализа решений Конституционного суда Латвийской 
Республики и Верхов ного суда Финляндии сделан вывод о приоритете Конституции при 
разрешении конститу ционно­правовых коллизий, которые могут возникнуть в связи с 
толкованием Конвенции о защите прав человека и основных свобод.
